U/EINFACHMAN

2022: The Year Of The MOASS



8 Reasons Why ∞ Soon

2022: Year of the MOASS [8 Reasons Why ∞ Soon] - April 30, 2022

Due Diligence

Good day, Apes!

This DD will provide you with a plethora of knowledge on why 2022 is year of the MOASS, and after absorbing this info, you'll reach such a high level of zen that you'll be completely impervious to any FUD.

Recommended Prerequisite DD:

1. Checkmate
2. We Are Unstoppable
3. Mountains of GME Synthetic Shares

2022: Year of the MOASS [8 Reasons Why ∞ Soon]

§1: RC's BBBY Call Options

§2: Indicators [Primarily Utilization]

§3: The Algorithm

§4: Stock Split Dividend

§5: NFT Marketplace

§6: Market Crash

§7: DRS

§8: DOJ Investigations

---

§1: RC's BBBY Call Options

1 month ago, RC purchased not only a significant amount of BBBY shares, but also a significant amount of call options, as per SEC Schedule 13D Filing from RC Ventures:

Under ITEM 3,

“The aggregate purchase price of the 7,780,000 Shares directly owned by RC Ventures is approximately $119,376,296, excluding brokerage commissions. **The aggregate purchase price of the call options exercisable into 1,670,100 Shares owned directly by RC Ventures is approximately $1,785,263, excluding brokerage commissions.**”

Here’s more details on the options he purchased:

SCHEDULE A

Transactions in Securities of the Issuer During the Past Sixty Days

RC VENTURES LLC

Nature of Transaction	Amount of Securities Purchased	Price per Share ($)	Date of Purchase
Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($60 Exercise Price)*	4,757	0.9324	02/28/2022
Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($75 Exercise Price)*	243	0.7603	02/28/2022
Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($60 Exercise Price)*	5,000	1.4693	03/01/2022
Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($60 Exercise Price)*	1,500	1.4115	03/01/2022
Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($75 Exercise Price)*	201	1.0803	03/01/2022
Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($80 Exercise Price)*	5,000	0.7103	03/01/2022

Call options varying from $60-$80, expiring January 2023.

This means that RC is betting that the price of BBBY will surpass $80 anywhere from now till January, 2023. These are the furthest OTM options that he could buy (meaning that the highest price he could bet the stock was going to surpass was $80, and he purchased those contracts).

The price of BBBY stock at the time of recording is around $15, meaning that for RC’s $60 calls to go ITM, the price of BBBY would need to increase 301%+ its current price (and increase 434%+ for the $80 call options). For this to happen, there’d need to be a January 2021-type run up, which is not possible anymore without igniting MOASS. In other words,

RC is betting MOASS before January, 2023. However, due to theta decay on options contracts, **RC is most likely anticipating MOASS to happen way before January, 2023 (likely sometime around mid-2022)**, which would be around the time of the NFT Marketplace/Stock-Split Dividend, which makes sense.

Also, if we further ponder why RC would go with BBBY contracts instead of GME contracts, it makes perfect sense. RC is the type of guy to only want to either HOLD or HODL his GME shares. I doubt he’ll be interested in selling any GME shares during MOASS, as to not inhibit the legendary event. But, if he wanted to collect profits on the MOASS, he could sell his BBBY options instead. BBBY, being one of the basket stocks attached to GME’s price, will squeeze once the MOASS launches, and so RC could turn his million dollar options position with BBBY into billions in profits, selling those contracts and collecting billions without messing with the MOASS directly. A brilliant play.

§2: Indicators [Primarily Utilization]

I’ve always considered utilization (percentage of shares available to borrow that have been lent) to be an important factor for determining our proximity to a squeeze. When I was primarily focused on amc during the first half of 2021, one of the

big factors I looked for was utilization, so when utilization hit 100% in May, I knew some significant price movement to the upside was going to come. It only took a few weeks after 100% utilization for the stock to go up 600% afterwards. Did MOASS ignite? No. That, to me, was merely FOMO, which took the basket stocks, along with GME, to critical levels in June that SHFs did everything they could to suppress the price (from getting their pals to dump shares, to stock halts, etc.). We should note, however, that utilization was at 100% for only a few weeks.

In the Social Science Research Network's “Short Squeezes and Their Consequences”, Schultz states "I find that the likelihood of squeezes is very low for most stocks. The risk of a squeeze becomes important when stocks are hard-to-borrow. Utilization, that is the proportion of shares available to lend that are currently on loan, has a strong positive correlation with the probability of a short squeeze. If utilization is high and a share loan is recalled, it is difficult to find a new source of shares. I find that for the majority of stocks that have low utilization rates, an all lender short squeeze appears about once every 40 years. For stocks with very high utilization of 90% or more, an all lender squeeze occurs about once every 11 days."

This goes in line with what I witnessed with ɑmc on May-June, 2021.

However, in the case today, GME has been at 100% utilization for 50+ consecutive trading days, which is big.

For reference, utilization was at 100% for about 90 consecutive trading days, leading to the January, 2021 run up.

Now it looks like we’re repeating that same pattern:

For utilization to be at 100% for so long at this point tells us that the spring is loading up for something BIG, and whatever is coming is going to explode like nobody's ever seen before. The January run up in 2021 was pure FOMO. That can't happen anymore. If GME explodes past critical margin levels, MOASS begins (legitimate short positions closing) and that 100x run up from August 2020-January 2021 will be peanuts compared to what's coming.

Note: I'm not saying that the current utilization will emulate the January, 2021 utilization data. It could easily take longer than 90 consecutive trading days, but every trading day at 100% utilization adds to the pressure which will inevitably make the price erupt into a nuclear MOASS. Another few months of consecutive 100% utilization alone will make the price of GME substantially harder to control.

There's also other strong indicators that lit up, such as the supertrend indicator. The weekly supertrend indicator went bullish 4 weeks ago. Last time it was bullish was in February, 2021.

Due note that when the weekly supertrend flipped bullish pre-January, 2021, several months went by until the January run up happened. This indicator, by no means, infers that a big price jump will happen within a short period of time, but that a strong run up in the price may occur sometime between now and several months from now.

There's also other long-term indicators that flipped bullish several weeks back, but they aren't nearly as important as utilization. TA is mostly useless when it comes to a manipulated stock. There's only a few indicators that actually hold some significance to me, and even then, are not indicative of anything happening immediately.

The most important indicator here is utilization, which may take several months for the price to react to, and ultimately pass margin levels, launching MOASS.

§3: The Algorithm

As I've said before, I consider TA to be mostly useless. This is primarily because Technical Analysis is used to predict "natural price movements". Well...there's nothing natural about GME's price movement. This is a heavily manipulated stock, so trying to predict natural trends of a heavily manipulated stock is counterintuitive.

I've previously seen TA posts from Apes saying things, such as "bull flag forming, moon soon" or "inverted head and shoulders pattern, we're gonna run". This is silly. I mean, just think about it logically. You really think a SHF manager manipulating GME is gonna be like "OH SHIT, everybody, look, there's a bull flag forming on GME! We're screwed!We're gonna lose control of the price, and have to close all our short positions now! NoooOOOO!!!"?

Miss me with that BS lmao. If anything, SHFs create fake bullish patterns just to get day traders to buy short term options thinking there will be a price jump on a certain date, only to get rekt when SHFs drop the price and collect their sweet premium money to help live another day.

I care very little about TA. What I DO care about is the $100 million algorithm these institutions use to manipulate the price.

The algorithm is used to optimize the best strategies for SHFs, for example, to determine how long they can feasibly keep the price down until they have to let it run a bit (due to rollover periods, etc.). Ergo, the algorithm can maximize the effectiveness of 'can-kicking', but eventually it comes to a point where the most strategic choice would be to let the price run a few weeks before shorting again.

What happened on January, 2021 was a scenario that overpowered the algorithm. The algorithm didn't say "hey, GME needs to go from $4 to $400+ by January, 2021". That's not how it works. It was slated to allow a gradual increase at the time, but got overpowered and taken over by retail FOMO. In January, retail regained control of the stock and took away control from the algo, up until the shutdown of the buy button where SHFs not only recalibrated the algo, but all pilled in to double down on their short positions by shorting the shit out of GME as soon as the buy button got shut off.

Regardless of any recalibrations from SHFs, their algorithm is designed to maximize profits, and at some point, the algo has to let there be a significant price increase and face a (say) 60% risk of tripping up and initiating MOASS rather than a 95% risk of initiating MOASS by burning through cash at an exponential rate, ultimately facing margin calls. Cost to borrow is an example. Cost to borrow was increasing at an exponential rate. Had they not allowed a price increase, the rate could've continued, eventually burning through their cash at an astounding speed. Every time that they allow a small run up to happen, however, they risk losing control of the price and ultimately initiating MOASS, which is why I'm curious to know how high of an algorithmic jump SHFs will have to deal with in the future.

The closest algorithm I could find that best emulated GME's algorithm (in past time; hence, basket stocks not included) is BRN.AX (Brainchip Holdings).

For comparison, this is GME's chart:

This is BRN's chart:

The similarities are striking. BRN's "January run" happened on September, 2020; hence, it's technically ahead of GME by around 5 months, which would allow us to see a possible glimpse into the future, based on the algorithm.

I wanted to dig deeper by deriving a correlation coefficient, so I crunched up the price movement data and this is what I got:





A general correlation of around .4, which is actually considered a moderate positive correlation.

Methodology:

I used Yahoo Finance to extract BRN's historical data (from September 2, 2020 to September 2, 2021) as well as GME's historical data (from January 21, 2021 to January 21, 2022). Combined the data sets in an excel spreadsheet, analyzed, and extrapolated the correlation coefficient based on each respective stock's price movements within each historical timeframe. More information of the code used to extrapolate Pearson's product-moment correlation.

Considering how complex these $100 million algorithms are, I recognize that extrapolating a correlation coefficient between these two stocks by analyzing a general/ambiguous factor, such as price movement, might not yield the most definitive results.

We can opt to take a rudimentary approach on extrapolating the correlation coefficient by instead analyzing the specific outliers (i.e. the strong periodic runs in price).

Circled below are the focal points we'll be comparing to extrapolate a correlation.

Taking these easily identifiable peaks, the dates between each stock's peak, and inputting the data into the Pearson correlation coefficient formula shown below,

$$r = \frac{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}}$$

r = correlation coefficient

x_i = values of the x-variable in a sample

$\bar{x}$ = mean of the values of the x-variable

y_i = values of the y-variable in a sample

$\bar{y}$ = mean of the values of the y-variable

We can obtain a correlation of around .8 or more, which is considered a strong positive correlation.

Note: The results aren't going to be ideally precise, as it depends what what crests/dates you end up using as your variables. For example, you could take slightly different dates in proximity to the crests, or use other smaller focal points you'd prefer in the data instead. Hence, the results could vary slightly, but the overall positive correlation is there. I've permutated the data using two different sets of focal points, and still came out with a (conservatively) moderate-to-strong positive correlation overall, which means that **we can indeed use BRN's chart to get a better understanding of what the future holds for GME.**

As I've stated before, GME is 5 months behind BRN, which means that the big spike you saw in BRN's January, 2022 chart would be algorithmically slated to happen to GME around the summer. HOWEVER, this is not a perfect correlation. Conservatively speaking here, we have a moderate correlation, meaning that there could be a variety of other factors that could delay that part in the algorithm, possibly prolonging a run up of that magnitude many more months out. It's important to proceed with caution, as to balance your expectations. Nevertheless, I see GME's algorithm slated to eventually have the giant run up in price sometime this year comparable to what BRN had in the beginning of this year, and as we already know, a run up of that magnitude will open the doors to extreme FOMO and uncontrollable price action, ultimately leading to: MOASS.

§4: Market Crash

Speaking of algorithms, let's talk about the algorithmic movement of the S&P 500.

There's only so much that the government/institutions can do to artificially inflate the market until the inevitable crash comes, and it appears that time is approaching soon.

I came across a post by Ape "choochoomthfka", who analyzed and compared the current S&P 500 price movements with that of 2008 and discovered algorithmic correlations that are pointing to a possible crash around the end of May, and just like the VW squeeze that came soon after the 2008 crash, the GME MOASS would come soon after the 2022 crash.

His statement: "I've independently confirmed the S&P chart overlay of 2008 & today for myself. The similarity is indeed striking, but I just wanted to alert apes to the fact that the progression is ~4.4x faster today than in 2008. If indeed similar, the big crash is ~May 20th and the squeeze ~May 25th."

This also goes in line with what we're seeing with the Buffet Indicator:

Figure 4



Now, although I agree that the current S&P price is likely being algorithmically controlled (via PPT, institutions, etc.), I don't want to promote dates. The truth is that we aren't entirely sure when the crash will happen. With a very strong confidence interval, I could say it will happen this year, but to say it will exact exactly near the end of May, I cannot. There can easily be wide standard deviations associated with these market algorithms that prevent us from pinpointing an exact date. For all we know, there's unaccounted variables that could allow the algorithm to delay the market crash another 3 or 4 months after May. The algorithm simply optimizes the most strategic move. That's all. If the S&P can no longer afford to be can kicked longer than June, the algorithm will signal and allow for the market to finally crash in June. However, if an externality shows up and changes the variables, it could delay things.

All I'm saying is don't get attached to specific dates. Nevertheless, the S&P 500 is following a similar pattern to 2008 that indicates a high likelihood of a market crash for 2022. As you may know, a market crash begets extreme loss in collateral for SHFs, triggering margin calls, and as such, MOASS. It's important to note, though, that similarly to VW, GME might initially drop in tandem with a market crash, only taking off in the opposite direction as soon as shorts start closing their positions, due to failure to meet a margin call.

Federal rate hikes, China's real estate market conundrum, 8.5% inflation rate (as of March, 2022), unprecedented records of margin debt, exponential increase in mortgage-backed security failures, spikes in credit default swaps, the Feds cracking down on unsustainable overleveraged positions from hedge funds, regulatory agencies/clearing corporations filing rules preparing for defaulting members, etc., are all additional signs adding to a likely market crash this year.

§5: Stock Split Dividend

I explained this in my Checkmate DD, so I won't be going over it too much here.

Basically, a 7:1 stock split (in the form of a dividend) would likely lead to MOASS, due to the fact that SHFs can't come up with 6 times the amount of synthetics that they produced over the entirety of GME's life within a relatively short time frame. This is why TSLA ran like crazy after they proposed their stock split dividend. Even if there was some sort of hidden loophole that they exploited, post-split dividend, we can expect FOMO (buying/DRS'ing pressure) to increase substantially, due to a significantly more affordable price.

§6: NFT Marketplace

The NFT Market was valued at $40 billion in 2021, per Chainalysis Inc. report.

Considering GameStop's market cap is valued at $10 billion, there's a lot of potential revenue GameStop can tap into by entering this market. Not only that, but as time goes on and crypto/NFTs become more globalized, the NFT Market can easily exponentially increase in valuation, similarly to how Bitcoin did when it started getting adopted by institutions internationally as a store of value.

OpenSea, currently the world's largest NFT Marketplace, is valued over $13 billion, according to Sephton at "CoinMarketCap Alexandria".

Yet, the OpenSea NFT Marketplace is incommensurable to the soon to be GME NFT Marketplace, due to a variety of reasons:

1. OpenSea has extremely high gas fees, which deter business/revenue through their services and creates dead weight loss.
2. Weak security protocols. They have tons of vulnerabilities in their code that make them susceptible to attacks/thefts. Many examples in the past of OpenSea users suing the Marketplace for letting their NFTS get stolen by cyber thieves due to their "security vulnerabilities".
3. GameStop gets nearly 1,000x more organic traffic via search engines than OpenSea does.

GME succeeds where OpenSea fails, by utilizing its partnerships with Loopring & Immutable X to eliminate high gas fees as well as reinforce security, using Ethereum's security rather than Polygon's (etc.). GameStop's NFT Marketplace will not only supersede, but augment the NFT Market as the dominant NFT Marketplace.

That being said, GME's market cap is already $10 billion. Say they get in the NFT Market in the summer and hit a valuation just half that of OpenSea this year. GME would end up with a high enough valuation putting itself past a $200 price. Maintaining a GME price past $200 would obliterate critical margin levels at this point, initiating MOASS.

In case you haven't noticed, something very big is gearing up this year, and I don't think RC bought extremely OTM BBBY calls this year just for the fun of it.

Very large partnerships with blue chip companies may be revealed upon implementation of the GME NFT Marketplace, and I believe we saw hints of it back in February:

Immutable | $IMX Retweeted

GameSpot @GameSpot · 5d

GameStop has confirmed plans for an NFT marketplace, announcing a $100 million fund with Immutable X: trib.al/p06lgPF

117 274 1,682

Immutable | $IMX
@Immutable

Thanks, director of blockchain @Microsoft. Probably nothing.

> **Yorke E. Rhodes III** @yorkerhodes · 4d
> must be nothing
>
> @Xbox @Microsoft @GameStop twitter.cc Blockworks_/st...

11:23 PM · 2/4/22 · Twitter Web App

477 Retweets **61** Quote Tweets **2,208** Likes

Yorke E. Rhodes III
@yorkerhodes

must be nothing

@Xbox @Microsoft @GameStop

> **Blockworks** @Blockworks_ · 5d
> Replying to @morgan_chittum
> This fund is a joint venture with @Immutable which will also power the forthcoming @GameStop NFT marketplace.
>
> Story by @morgan_chittum ...
> Show this thread

6:08 AM · 2/4/22 · Twitter Web App

411 Retweets **56** Quote Tweets **2,164** Likes

Justin Kan
@justinkan

yeah i built @twitch
it has millions of users.
& gaming NFTs are way bigger.

9:39 PM · 2/7/22 · Twitter Web App

1,966 Retweets **327** Quote Tweets **11.4K** Likes

frey
@frey

yeah i helped build @Apple Pay
it now has billions of users.
& NFTs are way bigger.

9:13 AM · 2/7/22 · Twitter for iPhone

1,168 Retweets **84** Quote Tweets **10.1K** Likes

I'm going to end with this: there were tons of complaints (likely from shills) that RC has been so secretive about the NFT Marketplace. If you have something REALLY good on your hands, are you going to go out and tell everyone? No. You wait until the time is right to present it. Companies that don't have anything good on their hands will be all talk, nothing much to present. The talking would come to just fluff their position and provide a façade to investors. RC is the exact opposite personality. This project has been in the works for the past year, and I genuinely believe when it delivers that it will exceed expectations.

This NFT Marketplace, once implemented (and any additional hidden partnerships announced), could be a very big driver for FOMO soon after, ultimately breaking shorts' banks and kickstarting MOASS.

§7: DRS

I've explained this before in §3 of my We Are Unstoppable DD. The Price Suppression Quandary.

"If the price of GME exceeds a certain point, margin calls will ensue, starting a snowball effect which will lead to MOASS. The more they short, the more money they lose, the more margin requirements pose a problem to them, and the more they will need a lower price.

Now, if the price of GME declines too low, as I've demonstrated in "§ 1: Relentless Dip Buying", Apes will double, triple, quadruple, etc., their ability to buy up the float and register it.

Example: Let's say, at the price of $120, it will take 10 months to lock 100% of the float. If SHFs decrease the price to $60, it will now take 5 months to lock 100% of the float. $30? 2.5 months. $15? A little over a month. By taking the price down so much, they effectively accelerate their demise, which is why they need a higher price.

This is also not including any outside entities purchasing the dip (e.g. institutions, pension funds, or even angel investors, such as RC, Musk, etc.)."

This is at the basic level. In reality, a price at $40 or below could technically allow GameStop to lock up the rest of the float themselves with their cash on hand, so it would immediately be game over if SHFs tried to pull off something like that. The more time that goes on, however, the less and less room SHFs have to breath. Their margin call threshold is getting tighter each month that goes by. For example, back in June, their critical margin levels were around $350, meaning a sustained underlying close above $350 would've likely have led to margin calls/MOASS. As several months have gone by and they've burnt through so much cash with the stock that's only been getting harder to short every month, the critical margin levels that would beget margin calls now lies around $200-$210, which is why GME was halted around $200 this March, and SHFs threw everything they had once trading resumed in an attempt to regain control of the price. Their situation will continue to get more difficult as the number of registered shares increases.

Every share DRS'ed crunches down the float of available shares, and strengthens the bullish indicators. SHFs cannot sustain this indefinitely, as the pressure of DRS'ed shares continues to build until an eventual snap of the algorithm, taking Apes straight to the moon.

§8: DOJ Investigations

When GameStop's 10Q came out on December 8, 2021, for the first time, this came up (pg. 14):



As of October 30, 2021, October 31, 2020 and January 30, 2021 there were 1.1 million, 4.6 million and 4.6 million, respectively, of unvested restricted stock and restricted stock units. As of October 30, 2021, October 31, 2020 and January 30, 2021 there were 77.0 million, 69.8 million and 69.9 million, respectively, shares of Class A common stock, including unvested restricted shares, legally issued and outstanding.

As of October 30, 2021, 5.2 million shares of our Class A common stock were directly registered with our transfer agent, ComputerShare.

A few days after that was published, this happened:

Now, is it a coincidence that the DOJ immediately launched a criminal investigation into SHFs soon after GameStop's 10Q published, showing registered shares from Apes? Maybe, maybe not. But, I've talked about this happening way before the DOJ even launched an investigation.

From my past DD Mountains of GME Synthetic Shares:

“I expect the closer we get to locking 100% of the float, the stronger the pressure the government will feel to taking initiative themselves, as once the float is 100% locked, there's no going back, and the entire world will witness the synthetics shitshow that will reveal itself and completely undermine the market's regulatory bodies. Moreover, as we also get closer to locking up the float, shorting GME back down will be a lot more costly and difficult for SHFs to do, which is why it's highly likely to me that the MOASS will start before the entire float gets locked up.”

I strongly believe that the DOJ has had enough of SHFs putting the economy in jeopardy, and that is self-evident with their race to begin indictments before the float gets locked.

From the Washington post recently:

> In a 59-page indictment, federal prosecutors in Manhattan accused Bill Hwang and his former chief financial officer, Patrick Halligan, of using the New York-based family firm as “an instrument of market manipulation and fraud, with far-reaching consequences” for other investors in U.S. equity markets.
>
> The case marks one of the highest-profile criminal white-collar prosecutions in years. The scheme swelled the firm’s portfolio from $1.5 billon to $35 billion in a single year, according to investigators, and relied on extensive borrowing from Wall Street banks to finance big bets

Hwang isn't the only one. I urge Apes to read into the DOJ's press release a few days ago. It's got really juicy info. Other indictments include Patrick Halligan, Archegos' CFO (charged with racketeering/fraud). Also, co-conspirators Scott Becker and William Tomita were indicted. If the judge were to throw the book at them, they'd practically end up with life in prison.

I want to share excerpts of the DOJ's press release here, just because it's so good:

“We allege that these defendants and their co-conspirators lied to banks to obtain billions of dollars that they then used to inflate the stock price of a number of publicly-traded companies,” said U.S. Attorney Williams. “The lies fed the inflation, and the inflation led to more lies. Round and round it went. **In one year, Hwang allegedly turned a $1.5 billion portfolio and pumped it up into a $35 billion portfolio. But last year, the music stopped. The bubble burst. The prices dropped. And when they did, billions of dollars of capital evaporated nearly overnight.**”

[...]

Today’s charges highlight our commitment to making sure the investment arena remains free from fraudulent activity of all kinds.”

[...]

Last year, when the prices fell, Hwang’s positions were sold off and he could no longer manipulate the prices, and billions of dollars of capital evaporated nearly overnight.

[...]

The indictment further alleges that in order to get the billions of dollars Archegos needed to sustain this market manipulation scheme, Hwang and his co-conspirators lied to and misled some of Wall Street’s leading banks about how big Archegos’s investments had become, how much cash Archegos had on hand and the nature of the stocks that Archegos held. As alleged, they told those lies so that the banks would have no idea what Archegos was really up to, how risky the portfolio was, and what would happen if the market turned.

As alleged, just over a year ago, the market turned and the stock prices Hwang and his co-conspirators had artificially inflated crashed, **causing immense damage to U.S. financial markets and ordinary investors.** In a matter of days, the companies at the center of Archegos’s trading scheme lost more than $100 billion in market capitalization, Archegos owed billions of dollars more than it had on hand, and Archegos collapsed. Market participants who purchased the relevant stocks at artificial prices lost the value they believed their investments held, the banks lost billions of dollars, and Archegos employees, many of whom were required to invest 25% or more of their bonuses with Archegos as deferred compensation, lost millions of dollars.

This is a very big deal. It's also definitive proof that SHFs lie about how much money they've been making by overly inflating their positions.

I remember in the past, sometimes shills would post articles that said "Kenny made 'x' amount of money recently," or "this month was such a profitable month for 'x' SHF. Apes aren't making a dent on SHFs' portfolios!" I knew it was all BS. But then those same shills try to gaslight you, saying things like "oh, you're against reality" or "get back to the real world". Well, this is the real world, bitches. The DOJ indicted this financial terrorist for racketeering, fraud, and artificially inflating

his positions. Moreover, our decision to call these guys financial terrorists is completely warranted. The DOJ literally just stated in the press release, I quote, "the market turned and the stock prices Hwang and his co-conspirators had artificially inflated crashed, causing immense damage to U.S. financial markets and ordinary investors". Financial terrorism defined.

Also in February, it was revealed that among the many SHFs the DOJ is investigating include Melvin Capital as well as Citron Research. Melvin Capital recently issued an apology to its investors and has been doing shady things to hide from their past.

Usually, the DOJ goes for the less significant ones first, once they catch a few rats that snitch, they can then work their way up the chain and expand the investigation.

A lot of shady, unexplained behavior has happened since the DOJ investigation has gone on, from buildings burning down rumored to have in possession documents related to criminal misdeeds of brokers/SHFs, to executives inexplicably stepping down from Citadel and other institutions.

After Michael Bodson (President of the DTCC & Executive at Citadel [Conflict of Interest]) stepped down from his position at the DTCC recently, along with billionaire Archegos owner, Bill Hwang, being indicted, I made this comment trying to connect the dots as to why these big players are now hiding from their past and/or stepping down from their positions:



According to computershared.net, nearly 35% of the float has been locked by Apes within 8 months [September, 2021-April, 2022], and over 70% of ALL outstanding shares have been locked.

The fact that over 70% of all outstanding GME shares have been locked should be raising alarm bells for the gov., which would explain why serious action is being taken now. If the DOJ's data scientists determine there's a too high risk of the float potentially getting locked by the end of the year, they will initiate MOASS before then. If they have to shut down Citadel and force close positions before all the shares get registered, they will. They're not standing idly by while 100% of the float gets locked. Financial terrorists like Kenneth Cordele Griffin are threatening the stability and longevity of the entire U.S financial market, and consequently, the global economy. Kenny & Co. are a threat to national security, a threat that will be neutralized by the DOJ before they let the float get 100% locked.

Additional Citations:

Buda, Andrzej. “Life Time of Correlation between Stocks Prices on Established and Emerging Markets.” *Arxiv.org*, Cornell, May 2011, https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1105/1105.6272.pdf.

Department of Justice (April 29, 2022). *Four Charged in Connection with Multibillion-Dollar Collapse of Archegos Capital Management*. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-charged-connection-multibillion-dollar-collapse-archegos-capital-management.

“Schedule 13D.” *SEC Filing | RC Ventures.*, SEC, 7 Mar. 2022, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000886158/000119380522000426/sc13d13351002_03072022.htm.

Schultz, Paul, Short Squeezes and Their Consequences (February 3, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4025226 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4025226.

“SEC Filing: Gamestop Corp..” *SEC Filing | Gamestop Corp.*, SEC, 8 Dec. 2021, https://news.gamestop.com/node/19686/html.

“SEC Filing: Gamestop Corp..” *SEC Filing | Gamestop Corp.*, SEC, 17 Mar. 2022, https://gamestop.gcs-web.com/node/19651/html.